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State of Industry and Construction Sector of Crimea in the Post-War Decade (1944–1954)

A comprehensive crisis of industrial production, heavy metallurgy, residential and municipal construction in Crimean Oblast during its time within the russian SFSR in the first post-war decade (1944–1954). The failure of reconstruction work by the leadership of the RSFSR became one of the key reasons for the Union government initiating the transfer of Crimean Oblast to the Ukrainian SSR.

Overview

Official Soviet historiography (in particular, the publication "History of Cities and Villages of the Ukrainian SSR", 1974) forged a myth of rapid and successful post-war economic reconstruction of Crimea under the leadership of RSFSR party organs. Co-opted propaganda reported the reconstruction of 459 enterprises and investments of over 1 billion rubles during 1944–1947.

However, closed archive documents and research indicate the opposite: five years after the end of the war (1950), the total volume of industrial production in Crimea amounted to only 56.9% of the pre-war level. In the region's core food, tobacco, and wine-making industries, this indicator did not exceed 30–35%. Out of 552 enterprises existing in 1953, only 427 barely fulfilled the gross plan (44% of which were food processing enterprises).

The development of metalworking and machine building on the peninsula became possible only after the restoration of the Dnipro Hydroelectric Station (1947) and the construction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Station, since local low-capacity power plants in Sevastopol and Kerch covered only the needs of industrial facilities of the Black Sea Fleet and heavy industry.

Key Details / Subtopics

  • Decline of heavy industry and metallurgy (Kerch):
  • The Kerch Metallurgical Plant (Voikov Plant), which before the war had 3 blast furnaces, was still not restored by the beginning of 1954 (only the foundry shop operated with secondary products).
  • The First Secretary of the Crimean Regional Committee Pavlo Tytov in a confidential letter to G. Malenkov dated February 27, 1953, complained of complete disregard for the reconstruction of the metallurgical base by the USSR Ministry of Black Metallurgy and the absence of a production base of the "Kerchmetallurgbud" trust.

  • The Kirov Coking Plant in Kerch was not restored by 1954; among metallurgical facilities, only the Kamysh-Burun Iron Ore Plant operated.

  • Collapse of residential and municipal construction in cities:

  • Feodosia: in the 10 years after the war, the city executive committee built only one 8-apartment building (with 40% of housing destroyed). The city lacked water, electricity, and a bathhouse-laundry complex, while improved pavement existed on only one street.
  • Kerch: due to the lack of construction capacity, the reconstruction of the Kirovsky district was practically not carried out. Republican decisions to organize the "Kerchtsyvilbud" trust (1953), build a sea passenger terminal (1952), a dairy plant (since 1945), and a confectionery shop remained unfulfilled.
  • Yevpatoria: according to the secretary of the district committee Kruhliak, in the 10 post-war years not a single square meter of housing was built in the city.

  • Rural areas: the construction of housing and social facilities was shifted entirely onto the peasant farms themselves.

  • Sanitary-ecological crisis and non-utilization of budget funds:

  • Due to the absence of treatment facilities in resort cities, sewage was discharged directly near the shore into the sea (in Feodosia — at the city beach), and in Yevpatoria — into topsoil layers, poisoning artesian waters. This caused a massive outbreak of dysentery in the summer of 1954.

  • Budget funds for water mains and sewerage year after year went unspent or were embezzled. In 1953, out of 2,999 thousand rubles allocated for sewerage, only 254 thousand rubles were utilized.

  • Reconstruction of Sevastopol:

  • Sevastopol was rebuilt more intensively as the main base of the Black Sea Fleet through direct funding injections from the budget of Ukraine and Ukrainian resettlers.

  • Despite the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of 1948 and J. Stalin's personal attention, reconstruction proceeded slowly. In a letter from P. Tytov and Black Sea Fleet Commander S. Gorshkov to G. Malenkov dated April 9, 1953, it was noted that out of the allocated 1,176 million rubles over four years, only 870 million were utilized (35 thousand m² of housing, schools, hospitals, and cinemas were not commissioned).

  • Economic grounds for the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine (1954):

  • The helplessness and neglected state of the peninsula under the administration of the RSFSR forced the Kremlin leadership to transfer the neglected oblast into the Ukrainian SSR, shifting the entire burden of post-war reconstruction onto the Ukrainian economy and people.

Contradictions and Open Questions

  • Propaganda reporting figures versus archival realities: The official publication "History of Cities and Villages of the Ukrainian SSR" (1974) claimed the commissioning of 459 reconstructed enterprises by 1948. However, closed party statistics (researched by I. Yatsenko) and official correspondence of Pavlo Tytov with G. Malenkov (1953) testify that key enterprises (Kerch Metallurgical Plant named after Voikov, Coking Plant) remained in ruins, and industry barely reached 56.9% of pre-war levels.